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Abstract
The field of behavioural biometrics stands as an appeal-
ing alternative to more traditional biometric systems, due
to the ease of use from a user perspective and the poten-
tial robustness to presentation attacks. Due to the nature of
the characteristic features being modelled, a person’s be-
haviour can be measured in a myriad of ways, growing with
the evolution of embedded sensor technologies. This pa-
per focuses its attention to a specific type of behavioural
biometric utilising swipe dynamics, also often referred to
as touch gestures. In swipe/touch gesture authentication,
a user swipes across the touchscreen of a mobile device to
perform an authentication attempt. The data from all avail-
able sensing systems on the device is collected and modelled
to characterise that person’s unique behaviour.
One characteristic of swipe authentication and new be-
havioural biometrics in general is the lack of available data
to train and validate models, which makes unsupervised
models particularly suited to the task. There is a strong
usability requirement to be able to enrol a user with as few
attempts as possible. From a machine learning perspective,
this presents the classic curse of dimensionality problem,
where one needs to train a model on a high dimensional
feature space with only a few observations. The problem
of modelling behavioural biometrics in this setting is dis-
cussed as one of learning probability distribution functions.
This is viewed through the lens of Bayesian unsupervised
models, which are well-suited to the low-data problem.
This paper presents results from a set of experiments
consisting of 38 sessions with labelled ‘victim’ as well as
blind and over-the-shoulder presentation attacks. Three
models are compared using this dataset; two single-mode
models: a shrunk covariance and a Bayesian Gaussian, as
well as a Bayesian non-parametric infinite mixture of Gaus-
sians, modelled as a Dirichlet Process (DP). Equal Error
Rates (EER) for the three models are compared and atten-
tion is paid to how EER varies across the two single-mode
models at low number of enrolment samples.
1. Introduction
The advent of mobile computing and widespread avail-
ability of mobile devices calls for authentication systems
that can be easily deployed to and used from any mobile
device. While biometric modalities such as facial and fin-
gerprint identification offer high accuracy, these approaches
present other difficulties, from preserving user privacy (for
example in facial identification) to the lack of availability of
high quality sensors in common mobile computing devices.
Furthermore, while certain biometric modalities such as fa-
cial and voice recognition can boast high accuracy when
evaluated against random attackers, their performance can
drop significantly when placed against targeted attacks such
as simple presentation attacks [9].
Behavioural biometrics offer an elegant alternative to
traditional biometrics, the premise being that certain be-
haviours such as typing and browsing on a desktop or mo-
bile device posses enough characteristic information about
an individual to identify them. Research in the field has
now been active for about four decades. The viability of
behavioural modalities such as keystroke dynamics where
investigated as far back as 1970s [4]. While the viability of
the idea was established, early adoptions of behavioural bio-
metrics systems often required bespoke infrastructure and
data acquisition, so they were not generally available for
consumption of the wider public.
The behavioural biometrics field is currently undergoing
a second wave of innovation as researchers and practition-
ers realise the potential the current interconnected world
of cyber-physical systems brings. This has brought about
the idea of mobile phone touch-based behavioural biomet-
rics. The concept has been introduced in various different
flavours, but the underlying idea is to utilise the available
sensor data in modern mobile phones in order to charac-
terise a user’s behaviour for the purposes of authentication.
Sensor channels often used involve the touch-screen data
such as horizontal and vertical coordinates, pressure, thumb
size and alignment as well as data from the embedded sen-
sors, if these are available (capturing acceleration, rate of
rotation, orientation, and magnetometer readings).
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The field of touch-based mobile phone biometrics can be
broadly categorised into continuous and non-continuous au-
thentication. Continuous authentication implies that mobile
phone data is gathered and monitored throughout a mobile
browsing session. Arguably, the continuous authentication
problem has received the most attention so far [10, 7, 13].
In the case of non-continuous authentication, be-
havioural touch data is only gathered as a user performs
the authentication attempt. While this approach has been
investigated in [15, 1], both of these studies concern touch-
screen data that is gathered from users in a passive manner
and subsequently used in order to evaluate the accuracies
of different modelling strategies. In [1], touchscreen data
from users is collected as they fill out a questionnaire on
an Android mobile device. In their experiments, they show
that authentication accuracy can be improved dramatically
if multiple swipe attempts are included in the models and
quote equal error rates (EER) of less than 0.5% in such set-
tings.
A noteworthy point highlighted in these previous stud-
ies is that the accuracy of biometric modalities which in-
corporate swipe dynamics tends to increase as more data is
gathered. Gathering data is easier in a continuous authen-
tication mode compared to the non-continuous case. This
means that it is relatively easier to build a ‘template’ of a
user’s swipe dynamics given a single session. However,
this might result in the user’s template having much higher
variance, thus making it more prone to attacks. The results
from studies published so far must be interpreted with this
in mind. As far as the authors are aware, no study exists that
explicitly incorporates data from over-the-shoulder (OTS)
impostors, where the impostors are assumed to have ob-
served the genuine user’s touchscreen behaviour. The lack
of such studies is partly what motivates the current paper.
1.1. Swipe Dynamics as a means of authentication
The appeal of behavioural biometrics as authenticators
is their ease of use, particularly in the case of touch screen
swipe dynamics, which translates to low user friction while
remaining strong against different types of attacks.
In this paper, the key problem under consideration is that
of utilising swipe dynamics as a means of non-continuous
authentication. The subsequent investigation identifies
techniques that are able to instantly assess whether a touch-
screen swipe pattern belongs to the individual in question,
minimising risk of an impostor accessing the system at any
point. A simple authenticator that requires few samples of
behaviour before a user can be enrolled into the system is
generally desirable. An example of how such an authentica-
tor would look in practice from a user’s perspective is shown
in Figure 3. The non-continuous authentication problem has
not been systematically studied to the authors’ knowledge.
1.2. Contributions of this paper
Bayesian novelty detection is introduced as a means of
enabling swipe dynamics authentication. The Bayesian ap-
proach alleviates several inherent problems of the data, par-
ticularly high dimensionality and low sample sizes. The
ability to set prior beliefs on model parameters allows accu-
rate predictions to be made for what would otherwise be an
ill-posed problem. Additionally, the use of Bayesian non-
parametrics makes it possible to infer multiple distributions
from the data when they exist, in a manner that naturally
avoids overfitting the probability distribution of the data,
which is a classic problem in high-dimensional data when
only a low number of obervations are available.
Results are presented on a new experimental dataset
which contains negative samples from both blind and over-
the-shoulder impostors. To the authors’ knowledge model
performance has not been evaluated against active over-the-
shoulder impostors elsewhere in the field.
2. Modelling Swipe Dynamics
Machine learning models have become a strong focus of
recent research efforts in biometric authentication, and be-
havioural biometrics is no exception. One important point
that distinguishes behavioural modalities from others is the
lack of availability of public data, which significantly af-
fects the appropriate choice of statistical and machine learn-
ing models that are most suitable for the task. Modalities
such as facial and voice enjoy the availability of many pub-
lic datasets which can be used to develop and evaluate mod-
elling strategies [3, 11, 5].
Available public behavioural biometric datasets are
scarce, and where they do exist, they are often of limited
use. In order for a dataset to be useful for training and
evaluation of new models, certain factors such as recorded
channels, sample rate, device model, and screen size must
be the same. The context of the experimental setup used for
data collection also affects the usability of datasets. For ex-
ample, training a model on data from subjects performing
simple browsing through mobile phone pages will gener-
ally not be of much use to classify data from subjects swip-
ing once across the screen to approve a transaction. Addi-
tionally, mobile phones evolve at a fast rate, meaning that
data collected today is bound to be of much lower quality
in comparison to that of mobile phones a few years into the
future.
The general lack of available data, combined with the
fast evolution of the data acquisition quality of mobile com-
puting devices make novelty detection [12] a suitable mod-
elling strategy for mobile phone touch-based authentica-
tion. Supervised models are difficult to utilise in a real-
world environment given the general difficulty of obtain-
ing negatively labelled samples. For this reason, most of
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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the previous work has focused on the use novelty detec-
tion (a type of unsupervised learning) as a general strat-
egy for detection. However, a common factor amongst re-
cent research is a ‘scatter-gun’ approach to simply report-
ing EERs for all popular and well-known novelty detection
methods [12], including the one-class Support Vector Ma-
chines, neural networks (largely autoencoder networks), K-
Nearest-Neighbours and Gaussian mixture models [2].
In this study, focus is given to the class of novelty de-
tection methods that model the probability distribution of
the behavioural features. A nuanced discussion is con-
tributed to how these models solve certain practical chal-
lenges; namely that of training with few samples as well as
the model’s inherent ability to capture multiple behaviours
exhibited by a single user. These are discussed in more de-
tail in Section 2.3
2.1. Features from swipe gestures
Arguably, the feature space derived from swipe data is
as important, if not more, than how this is modelled. A
useful feature space is one that is consistent for a given user
and discriminating of impostor behaviour. Of course, one
does not know a-priori which features are consistent for any
given user. In fact, the strategy adopted by previous studies
has been to use a range of summarising features from each
swipe gesture. It is common to compute features such as
horizontal and vertical coordinates, velocity and angles and
extract first and second order moments as well as start and
end points.
The feature vectors used in this study were derived from
the raw touch screen coordinates and pointer size measure-
ment. A feature vector has been assembled using horizon-
tal and vertical coordinates, together with their first and
second order derivatives with respect to time (velocity and
acceleration) as well as first and second order derivatives
with respect to each other (angle and angular acceleration).
These coordinates were resampled, using techniques bor-
rowed from functional data analysis, to a fixed-length vec-
tor representing the swipe position, velocities and acceler-
ations on an even time grid representing one swipe ‘cycle’.
The touch pointer size was also resampled accordingly and
used as an additional feature. An example of swipe data can
be seen in Figure 2.
2.2. Enrolment Process
When users have not authenticated enough times for a
model to be trained on their behaviour they are considered
to be in the ‘enrolment’ phase. A behavioural authentica-
tor should be able to begin making predictions with as few
samples as possible, ideally in the range of one to five. This
low threshold facilitates ease-of-use and protects user ac-
counts from unauthorised access as quickly as possible. Af-
ter the enrolment threshold has been passed the user will
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Figure 1. Approximate Distribution of User Behaviours
have a valid trained model and predictions can be made.
Outside of laboratory conditions a behavioural model can
be retrained at regular intervals using newer data as users
continue to authenticate. Frequent retraining combats ‘be-
havioural drift’ as users become more familiar with the sys-
tem. While these two notions of continuous learning and
behavioural drift each merit a nuanced discussion, this is
left outside of the scope of the current paper.
Over time, a significant portion of users tend to de-
velop multiple well-defined behaviours. Empirically, this
has been seen to start occurring after users have authenti-
cated approximately 20 times. These behaviours are usually
maintained simultaneously and can have explicit meanings
such as a user swiping with two different hands, or simply
be subtle unconscious changes in swiping patterns. This
motivates the need to model them explicitly. Figure 1 shows
the approximate distribution of the number of behaviours
seen in touch screen gestures per user from a manually la-
belled sample of profiles.
Figure 2 shows examples of users who exhibit single
and multiple behaviours. The lines in these plots denote
the paths of swipe gestures, with the marker indicating the
end point of the gesture. A single behaviour is defined by
a unified grouping of gestures which have similar direc-
tion and shape, as can be seen in Figure 2a. Multiple be-
haviours occur when two or more single behaviour groups
are present for a single user. These groups can overlap, as
seen in Figure 2b, where the lower-left cluster consists of
two behaviour groups with opposing directions.
2.3. Bayesian Novelty Detection
Given the small number of observations typically found
in non-continuous swipe dynamics authentication, coupled
with the inherent high dimensionality of time-series data,
the problem is classically ill-posed. With few training sam-
ples the ability to train models directly from the available
behaviour of a single user is greatly diminished. The use
of classical machine learning models in this instance will
typically result in inaccurate predictions due to the lack of
information contained in the training data.
This motivates the use of Bayesian models where infor-
mation from priors can be incorporated into the model. This
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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Figure 2. Touch Screen Gesture Behaviours
has the effect of increasing the total amount of information
available to the model and allows more accurate predictions
to be made. Such priors can be derived from a reasonable
default or the general population of users, if available. Tak-
ing a Bayesian approach allows for the calculation of model
probability estimates, therefore alleviating overfitting. This
is particularly important given the ill-posed nature of the
problem.
The central approach taken to modelling presented here
is based around fitting probability distributions to the given
training data. Scoring of subsequent samples is done via the
model likelihood, where the decision boundary is calibrated
based on the likelihood of the training samples.
Three models are presented, representing an evolution
of complexity in modelling approach. The first model is
a non-Bayesian multivariate Gaussian distribution with a
regularised covariance matrix. The second and third mod-
els are both Bayesian; a multivariate Gaussian distribution
with priors derived from the user population and an infinite
Gaussian mixture with a Dirichlet process prior on the com-
ponents [14]. The relative performance of these models in
the swipe dynamics task is presented in Section 4.
2.3.1 Shrunk Covariance
The shrunk covariance model is the simplest of the three
presented in this paper. It models the probability distri-
bution of the data, p(x) as a multivariate Gaussian, x ∼
N (µ,Σ), which is parametrised by its mean µ and covari-
ance Σ.
When the number of samples is large relative to the num-
ber of features, the maximum likelihood estimate of the co-
variance works well as an estimate of the covariance. How-
ever, when the number of samples is comparatively small
against the number of dimensions, the sample covariance is
a poor estimate of the true underlying data covariance. Esti-
mation of Σ in this setting is well known to be unstable and
lead to singularities when inverting it to arrive at the preci-
sion. One way in which this instability manifests itself is by
adding extra variance.
A common solution to alleviate this is to shrink the co-
variance matrix towards the diagonal,
Σˆshrunk(α) = αΣˆ + (1− α)diag(Σˆ) (1)
where α is a hyperparameter that controls the strength of
the covariance shrinkage. The shrunk estimate of Equation
(1) thereby reduces the overall variance of the covariance
estimate. This is a form of regularisation in covariance esit-
mation. Selecting an appropriate value for α can be be done
via cross-validation.
Prediction in the model is carried out by evaluating the
model log-likelihood of the Gaussian distribution with pa-
rameters (µ,Σshrunk) (where µ is the maximum likelihood
estimate of the mean) of a test sample x∗. Alternatively,
one could use the Mahalanobis squared distance of the test
sample under the shrunk covariance estimate.
2.3.2 Bayesian Multivariate Gaussian
The shrunk covariance estimator can be considered a special
case of estimation of the full posterior probability distribu-
tion of µ and Σ, given dataD. This can be carried out using
Bayesian inference, which leads to the Bayesian multivari-
ate Gaussian model. Instead of using maximum likelihood
estimates for the mean and covariance, Bayesian priors are
constructed for these parameters. The priors can be defined
by specifying a suitable belief on the parameter values (for
example, position variance to be 15% of screen size) in ab-
sence of any reliable observations, or alternatively it can be
based on a sample of the user population.
In the discussion that follows, the parameter vector θ =
(µ,Σ) is used to represent the parameters of the Gaussian
distribution. For a single user, the sample distribution is
assumed to be multivariate normal with conjugate (normal-
inverse-Wishart) priors on the mean and covariance:
p(Σ) = InvWish(Ψ0, ν0) (2)
p(µ|Σ) = N (µ0, k−10 Σ) (3)
p(X|µ,Σ) = N (µ,Σ) (4)
As the normal-inverse-Wishart prior on (µ,Σ) is conju-
gate for a multivariate Gaussian likelihood, the posterior is
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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of the same family, that is,
p(Σ|D) = InvWish(ΨN , νN ) (5)
p(µ|Σ,D) = N (µN , k−1N Σ) (6)
where D denotes training data and,
µN =
k0µ0 + nx¯
k0 +N
(7)
kN = k0 +N (8)
ΨN = Ψ0 +
∑
i
(xi − x¯)(xi − x¯)T+
k0N
k0 +N
(x¯− µ0)(x¯− µ0)T
(9)
νN = ν0 +N (10)
Prediction of a test sample x∗ is carried out using the model
posterior predictive distribution,
p(x∗|DN ) =
∫
p(x∗|θ)p(θ|D)dθ (11)
This is a convolution integral between the model likelihood
p(x∗|θ) and the posterior distribution of the model parame-
ters p(θ|D) over the space of model parameters, which has
a closed-form analytic solution,
p(x∗|DN ) = tvN−d+1(µN ,
kN + 1
kN (νN − d+ 1)ΨN ) (12)
Inferring the mean is relatively straightforward; one op-
tion is to let k0 → 0, which loosely corresponds to an un-
informative prior for µ. Inference about the covariance is
more challenging, given the comparatively high number of
features in relation to training samples, which can be on the
order of 5-10 times. A simple approach is to use a global
estimate of the covariance in constructing the prior distribu-
tion for the covariance,
Σˆglobal =
1
N − P
P∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
(xiu − x¯p)(xip − x¯p)T (13)
where N =
∑P
p=1Np is the total number of samples and
Ψ0 = (ν0 − d− 1)Σˆglobal (14)
This allows shrinkage of the posterior towards Σˆglobal.
In the examples presented in this paper, a shrunk esti-
mate of the global covariance was used:
Σˆshrunk global(α) = αΣˆglobal + (1− α)diag(Σˆglobal) (15)
where α determined by cross validation, using the out-of-
sample log-likelihood of the normal distribution evaluated
at (x¯p, Σˆshrunk global(α)) for profile p as a scoring criterion.
Intuitively, the advantage of this approach is that when
the number of samples is small, this method allows us to
borrow strength from other profiles in inferring the covari-
ance, and converges on the profile’s true covariance as the
number of samples increases.
2.3.3 Infinite Gaussian Mixture
The infinite Gaussian mixture is a Bayesian nonparamet-
ric model, meaning that the parameter space has infinite di-
mensions, which allows the parameter space to grow as the
parameter space is explores and more data is observed. In
practice this means that the model is very expressive, as it
allows the size of the parameter space to match the amount
of observed data. The idea behind this model in the context
of swipe dynamics is to explicitly model for multiple dis-
tributions as opposed to the previous models which assume
a single Gaussian. This is intended to cater for situations
where a user has begun to develop multiple behaviours. The
topology of the input feature space is assumed to be such
that the behaviour groups are isolated.
The number of mixture components is chosen via the
Chinese Restaurant Process [6], which iteratively assigns
training samples to the mixture components. There are prior
distributions on the cluster means and covariances which
have been chosen to be relatively uninformative so the mix-
ture itself is emphasised.
The key equations for this model are Equations 16 and
17. These equations determine the likelihood of a partic-
ular sample belonging to a particular cluster or being as-
signed to a new cluster, respectively. All training samples
are assigned to a single cluster initially and are reassigned to
the cluster with the greatest likelihood as the algorithm pro-
gresses. After a suitable number of sampling iterations the
cluster assignments for each sample will have converged.
The decision boundary for this model is constructed equiv-
alently to the shrunk covariance model.
The hyperparameters for the model are α, µ0, σ20 , and
σ2y . These are the α parameter of the Dirichlet distribution,
prior cluster mean, prior cluster variance, and a prior on
noise in the data, respectively. Note that µ0 ∈ RN and
σ20 , σ
2
y ∈ RN×N . Other parameters in Equations 16 and 17
are cluster assignments ci, the number of samples assigned
to a cluster ni, cluster precisions τk, and the total number
of training samples n. A negative subscript indicates all
clusters excluding the one indicated. The overall structure
of this model was derived from [8], additional detail can be
found there.
p(ci|c−i, µk, τk, α) ∝
n−i,k
n− 1 + αN
(
x˜i;
x¯knkτk + µ0τ0
nkτk + τ0
,
1
nkτk + τ0
+ σ2y
)
(16)
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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p(ci 6= ck,∀j 6= i|c−i, µ0, τ0, α) ∝
α
n− 1 + αN (x˜i;µ0, σ
2
0 + σ
2
x)
(17)
3. Experiments
One of the key motivators of this study is the evaluation
of swipe authenticators under realistic attack scenarios. The
two attack scenarios of interest are blind attacks, where the
attacker is assumed to never have observed a victim’s be-
haviour and over-the-shoulder (OTS) attacks, implying that
the attacker has been allowed to observe the victim’s be-
haviour by looking over their shoulder. Evaluating model
performance for a swipe authenticator under these scenar-
ios required gathering of fresh experimental data, given the
lack of suitable public benchmarks that consider this prob-
lem specifically. The experimental setup and data collection
used for the results presented in this paper is described in
this section.
3.1. Data acquisition and authentication prompt
Swipe data was collected by a specially designed mobile
phone application. The application collected touch screen
and any available embedded sensor data, though the sensor
data has not been used in this study.
The application prompts users to authenticate for a se-
cure session by using a swipe gesture to slide a dialog off
the screen. The user interaction with the mobile device is
therefore relatively constrained, as users are encouraged by
the interface to swipe the dialog horizontally and must use
gestures of a minimum length to remove it. Additionally,
the application is designed such that the screen orientation
is forced to portrait mode. These constraints facilitate more
accurate authentication as users must interact with the ap-
plication in a controlled manner, even outside of laboratory
conditions. A depiction1 of the authentication prompt dia-
log can be found in Figure 3. The user has begun swiping
the dialog to the right in this figure.
All experiments were carried out using a range middle
to high-end Android devices. A mix of device brands and
models was used, so the majority of the sessions were car-
ried out each with a different device type. The Android ap-
plication was designed to collect touch screen data at the
highest possible sampling rate for each device. For the N
transactions collected, the average sample rate was of 60Hz
with a standard deviation of 10Hz.
3.2. Experimental procedure
The experiments described in this paper were conducted
over three separate days (on Oct 23rd, Oct 30th and Nov
20th 2019). In each day, a cohort of subjects was assembled
and split into groups of three, where each member of the
1N.B. ‘Southfields Bank’ is fictional and the corresponding branding
was created for the demo application to give users context.
Figure 3. Authentication Prompt
group assumed the roles of either victim, blind attacker and
OTS attacker. There was no special selection process for the
subjects, they were gathered from volunteers in an office
environment. No demographic data was collected for the
subjects, but their age range varied from early twenties to
early sixties.
Each data collection session followed the following se-
quence:
1. Victim performs N authentication attempts.
2. Blind attacker performs N authentication attempts.
3. Victim performs N authentication attempts, where
OTS attacker gets to observe victim’s swipe behaviour.
4. OTS attacker performs N authentication attempts.
where the value of N = 10 was used for the Oct 23 and
Nov 20 sessions, and N = 20 for the Oct 30 session. In
total, 38 sessions were recorded.
Note that each subject was given a basic explanation of
the authentication process and given the opportunity to per-
form a small number of trial swipe attempts before data was
gathered. Subjects were free to sit or stand, most chose to
stand (note this data was not recorded). Figure 4 illustrates
swipe data gathered from one of the sessions. The shaded
green area indicates the 2σ confidence bounds of the en-
rolment data. The test data for the victim, blind and OTS
attackers can be seen in green, black and red respectively.
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Figure 4. Example of normalised swipe data from genuine users
with samples from blind and OTS impostors overlaid. Shaded area
indicates a 2σ confidence interval for the first 10 training swipes.
Model Blind EER OTS EER
Mean Median Mean Median
Shrunk Covariance 5.07 0.00 16.06 9.55
Bayesian Gaussian 4.54 0.00 16.10 5.96
Infinite Mixture 4.99 0.00 15.70 9.27
Table 1. Results
4. Results
4.1. Experiment Evaluation
In all cases the models were trained on the first 10 gen-
uine samples (sorted by time) for each user. A number of
the profiles in the dataset only contain 20 samples total for
the genuine user so the training sample size was restricted
to keep the evaluation balanced. The models were evalu-
ated on the remainder of the genuine samples not used for
training and all of the samples for the given impostor.
The metric used for evaluation is the Equal Error Rate
(EER). The EER is evaluated on a per-user basis as this
provides insight into the way the errors distribute across the
population of users in the study. Calculating the EER on a
global basis can hide poor performance for users which are
difficult to classify. The statistics presented in Table 4 are
the means and medians of these user EER distributions.
Of the 38 profiles in the dataset, 6 failed to enroll due to
lack of sufficient genuine samples. A number of the swipe
gesture samples for these profiles were rejected due to in-
sufficient data quality. The results presented later in this
section therefore only concern the 32 remaining profiles.
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Figure 5. Equal-Error Rate Distributions
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Figure 6. Learning Curves; Shrunk Covariance and Bayesian
Gaussian Models
4.2. Experiment Results
The experimental results are shown in Table 4. Accom-
panying plots of the score distributions with the mean and
median overlaid are shown in Figure 5.
The Bayesian Gaussian model performed the best in the
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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(a) Good Behaviour Separability (b) Bad Behaviour Separability
Figure 7. Illustration of victim (green), blind (black) and OTS (red)
swipes using a t-SNE projection into a 2-dimensional space.
blind impostor case, with a mean EER of 4.54%. All of the
models performed quite well in this scenario, however, as
each model classified the majority of the samples correctly.
This can be seen from the left-hand column of Figure 5. It is
expected that the models perform well in the blind impostor
scenario, as it is unlikely that an uninformed attacker would
be able to accurately replicate the the genuine user’s swipe
gesture.
The error rates for the OTS impostor experiments are
somewhat higher than those of the blind impostors, this
is again expected due to the attacker now having informa-
tion about the genuine user’s gestures. The models still re-
main quite discriminative, however, with the infinite mix-
ture model having the best overall mean EER of 15.70%.
The Bayesian Gaussian model has arguably the best dis-
tribution of scores in this scenario, with a median EER of
5.96%. A larger-scale experiment would be required to
definitively establish which of these models is the overall
best-performing.
These results show that it is generally difficult to pre-
cisely replicate another user’s behaviour even with knowl-
edge of the required gestures. There is an approximate 10%
increase in EERs between the blind and OTS impostor ses-
sions. Considering the large feature space it is unsurpris-
ing that an attacker has difficulty replicating the correct be-
haviour across all the features. Figure 4 shows two sam-
ple profiles with the features projected into a 2-dimensional
space, one with easily separable behaviour and the other
without. The example with good separability had low EERs
across all the experiments; this is relatively easy to see as
the impostor samples are well-separated from the genuine
samples. The other example was the worst performing pro-
file in the dataset, equally the reason for this is readily ap-
parent as all of the distributions are overlapping. Note that
some information is lost when the features are projected into
2-dimensional space, these plots are merely for illustration
of the problem.
4.3. Multiple Behaviours
The infinite mixture model has the inherent capability
to learn multiple distributions from the data. Though the
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Figure 8. Infinite Mixture Component Usage Distribution
training sample sizes used in the experiments are somewhat
small for explicit development of multiple behaviours, the
mixture model learned multiple distributions for the profiles
regardless. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the number
of mixture components learned per profile. The somewhat
large number of distributions is possibly due to the spheri-
cal priors used for the component covariances which have
encouraged the model to learn feature correlations via the
components. This does not appear to have unduly affected
the model performance, though the phenomenon bears fur-
ther research.
4.4. Low-Sample Learning
In Figure 6, learning curves for shrunk covariance and
Bayesian Gaussian models are shown, from 2 to 10 train-
ing samples. These plots show the key advantage of using
a Bayesian model when few training samples are available.
The Bayesian model shows significantly lower EERs than
the shrunk covariance model when only 2-5 training sam-
ples are available. The effect is more pronounced in blind
impostor scenario as the data is generally easier to learn, as
established above. To a somewhat lesser degree, the benefit
is still observed in the OTS impostor scenario.
From these results it is apparent that a Bayesian approach
is highly effective for the swipe dynamics problem as it
enables accurate predictions in high-dimensional data with
only a few training samples.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Authentication using swipe dynamics, a type of be-
havioural biometric has been discussed. Specifically, the
paper has discussed some of the key problems facing this
type of authentication, particularly around accurate data
collection and quality. The lack of large scale datasets in
this domain has driven recent research efforts to the use of
unsupervised learning models.
This paper introduces three different types of probabilis-
tic models: a Gaussian shrunk covariance, a Bayesian mul-
tivariate Gaussian, and an infinite mixture model. Two
different attacker scenarios are presented, those of a blind
and an over-the-shoulder impostor. The three models are
compared across the different attack scenarios, with the
c© Callsign Inc. 2020. All Rights Reserved.
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Bayesian Gaussian model showing the best performance
at a mean EER of 4.54% for the blind impostor scenario
and the infinite mixture model for the OTS impostor with a
mean EER of 15.70%. Recursive training results are shown
for the Bayesian Gaussian and shrunk covariance models,
where the Bayesian model converges to the final error rate
with approximately 30% of the training samples required
by the shrunk covariance in some cases. This indicates the
strength of the Bayesian approach in general.
There are two key areas of future research that bear in-
vestigation. First, the use of hierarchical priors for the
Bayesian models presented in this paper. The priors used
here are constructed relatively naively and it is likely that
the model performance could be improved, for example,
through incorporating information from a population of
similar users or mobile devices. Secondly, modelling mul-
tiple behaviours has only been investigated briefly in this
paper and more in-depth research is warranted. Specifi-
cally, curating a dataset with explicit labelled single- and
multiple-behaviour profiles and comparing the modelling
approaches presented here with others is a logical next step.
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